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Calendar
May 3-Denver Bar Association regular monthly luncheon meeting, 12:15
P. M., Chamber of Commerce dining room. This is the annual
election meeting for the election of officers, trustees, and members
of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association, and is
the final regular meeting until fall.
July 22, 23 and 24-Tenth Judicial Circuit annual conference, Post Office
Bldg., Denver, Senior Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips presiding.
September 6, 7, 8 and 9-American Bar Association annual meeting,
Seattle, Washington.

Progress of the Judiciary Committee's Plan
By

STANLEY

H.

JOHNSON

Executive Secretary

The Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association ran into a
serious obstacle, in forwarding its plan for improvement of the courts, in
the 1941 statute making more rigid the requirements for initiating measures.
This statute extends the constitutional limitations upon filing petitions for
amendment over the four months required in the constitution to eight months
and the percentage of electoral votes from 8% to 15%. In other words, a
petition for a measure adopting the non-partisan plan of selection, abolishment of the justice of the peace courts, permitting salaries to be increased
during a judge's term of office, and other changes necessary in the constitution to effectuate the plan, had to be filed by March 2d and to contain approximately fifty thousand names. Furthermore, the statute requires that the various measures be published in local newspapers in sixty-two counties at a cost
of approximately ten dollars a word. There was not time available, after
the joint committees had completed the final plan, to finance such a proposition nor to obtain the necessary signatures, if the money for publication could
have been raised.
Therefore, the only possibility of submitting to the people the necessary
constitutional amendments was to persuade the legislature to meet in a special
session. It is common knowledge that the legislators are underpaid and that
their regular sessions are so long that the business of many of the legislators
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suffers. The amount they receive for their services is inadequate even to pay
the cost of living in Denver during the session. It would, therefore, have
been unfair to request them to meet over any controversial measures.
The most controversial portion of the committee's plan is, of course,
that of non-partisan selection, the plan recommended by the American Bar
Association and adopted in Missouri in 1940. Although three-fourths of the
attorneys supported this plan at the state bar convention, it was felt that to
attempt to include it in the matters the legislators would be asked to consider
in special session would be unfair to them and would possibly jeopardize the
remainder of the plan. The abolition of the offices of justice of the peace
and constable and the substitution of county judges and magistrates was also
considered to some extent to be controversial and it was felt best to submit
this matter to the legislators in two forms, by amendment to Article VI,
Section 25, of the constitution. Under one proposal the legislature could at
its discretion abolish these offices; under the other the offices are abolished
and the county court-magistrate substitution is provided for a trial period until
1953, at which time the matter is left to legislative discretion.
In December the drafting of the necessary bills and resolutions for amendments were assigned to the chairmen in Denver who had worked on these
subjects. During January, and the first half of February, constant meetings
were held until all the necessary measures had been drafted, checked, and
re-checked. In February these bills and resolutions were presented by Colonel
Van Cise and myself to the Board of Governors in Colorado Springs and
the board's advice requested concerning future action to be undertaken by
the committee.
The board decided that, in view of the amount of money contributed
by the bar to the forwarding of this plan, the Judiciary Committee should
make every effort to persuade the legislators to meet in special session to consider the less controversial features. The board and the committee further
felt that it was imperative to make every effort to provide for increases in
salaries for the judges of the various courts at a special session, for the reason
that evidence has been obtained that without such an increase some of our
best judges may not run for re-election in 1948. Such an increase, to 'be
effective, must be passed at the special session with a supporting constitutional
amendment permitting increase of judges' salaries during their terms of office.
Without such provision any new judge appointed in 1950 to the Supreme
Court, for example, would be entitled to any increase voted at the regular
session in 1948, whereas all judges elected for the full term in 1948 would
not be entitled to an increase until ten years had elapsed. It was, therefore,
finally determined that the following bills and resolutions should be mailed
out to the district and county chairmen of the committee, and to the district
and county judges urging them to discuss these matters with the legislators
in their counties and to attempt to obtain written, or at least oral, consent
from the legislators to meet in special session to consider these measures. It
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was felt that, if a majority of the legislators would consent, the governor
could be persuaded to call a session for this purpose.
The following portions of the plan were felt to be proper for submission
to the legislature at such a session:
1. A bill increasing the salary of the chief justice to ten thousand dollars, the associate justices of the Supreme Court to ninety-five hundred dollars, all district judges to seventy-five hundred dollars, and also the county
court and juvenile court judges in Denver, and an increase in the salaries of
county judges according to the classifications of the counties over the salaries
permitted by the legislature in 1945. In the first three classes of counties these
increases range from thirty to forty per cent with a considerable difference
between the judges in Class 3, Group B, and Class 4, Group A, because of
the fact that judges in the first three classes, who must be qualified lawyers
under the plan, are not permitted to practice law or engage in any other
gainful occupation, whereas those in the last three classes are not required
to be attorneys and may engage in other occupations.
2. A retirement pension bill providing for mandatory retirement at age
75 and for a pension for -judges 65 years and over of forty per cent of
salaries for those who have served at least ten years, and fifty per cent for
sixteen years and over. The bill also includes a similar pension for judges
removed from office for disability, except in the case of judges who have
served less than ten years, who are allowed a pension for the 'Period of years
which they have served.
3. A bill for a judicial council of nine members consisting of judges,
lawyers and laymen, as provided in the committee's final plan.
4. The necessary amendments to Article VI of the constitution to
effectuate the committee's plan as follows:
Section 2. Transferring control over all courts from the Supreme Court
to the chief justice.
Section 5. Permitting the substitution of retired supreme court judges
or district judges, retired or active, for any supreme court justice temporarily
absent.
Section 8. Providing for the election of a chief justice by the justices
of the Supreme Court, selection to be for administrative ability, regardless
of seniority of age or service, and providing for extension of his powers by
rule or by statute. The section also gives the chief justice power to assign
judges of any court of record to any other court of record.
Section 10. Requiring judges of the Supreme Court to be qualified to
practice law.
Section 12. Providing that district judges shall hold court for each other.
Section 16. Requiring district judges to be qualified to practice law.
Section 18. Prohibits judges (except county judges in counties of less
than ten thousand population) from receiving any compensation other than
judicial salaries, prohibits judges from practicing law, holding public office,
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accepting other employment, contributing to or taking part in political campaigns, or holding party office. It limits vacations to six weeks, sickness not
included, and abolishes the fee system of compensation.
Section 22. Provides for an additional county judge, if necessary, in
counties over one hundred thousand population, gives the governor appointive
power to fill vacancies in the office of county court judge, and requires that
county judges in counties with a population exceeding ten thousand shall be
qualified to practice law.
Section 23. Corrects the present omission in the jurisdiction of the
county court of the estates of minors and mental incompetents, regardless
of the amount involved, and provides that appeals may be taken from the
county to the district court, or to the Supreme Court, in such cases and in
such manner as may be prescribed by law. The purpose of the last provision
is to permit an appeal, on any case tried, from a county judge not a lawyer,
to the district court, before an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.
Section 25. Permits the abolition of the offices of justice of the peace
and constable at the discretion of the legislature. As already stated, an
alternate Section 25 was drafted to carry out the committee's plan in case
the legislature should be willing to adopt it.
This alternate section abolishes the offices of justice of the peace and
constable, effective six months from its passage. The jurisdiction of the justice
courts is conferred upon the county courts, magistrates, and referees by the
county judge until June 1, 1953, when the legislature may continue this
plan in effect or adopt a new one. Service of summons and papers shall be
made in the manner provided for courts of record. Special constables may
be appointed by the county judge. There may be magistrates in any county
with the consent of the chief justice, and in counties exceeding twenty thousand population a county judge may appoint one magistrate, and for each
additional thirty thousand in excess of fifty thousand an additional magistrate without his consent. The county judge may, for non-contested matters,
appoint referees to administer payment of fines and pleas of guilty. The
county judge fixes the salary of the magistrate not exceeding 75% of his
own and may, with approval of the county commissioners, fix the compensation of referees. Magistrates and referees serve at the pleasure of the county
judge. The procedure and costs until otherwise provided by law or rule are
as now prescribed for justice courts. Magistrates may also act as police magistrates and municipal judges.
Additional details concerning the jurisdiction and procedure of justice
court cases may be made by rule or law.
Section 29. Provides that vacancies of offices of all courts of record shall
be filled by appointment by the governor as provided by law. This leads up
to the subsequent adoption of any plan of selection of judges that might be
determined upon.
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Section 31. Requires that all judges of all courts of record, newly
appointed or elected, shall serve a trial term of at least one year before election tothe regular term. This permits the voters to see what the candidate's
record has been under any system of election before voting him in for the
regular term.
Section 32. Makes retirement of judges mandatory at age 75 and provides for removal in case of disability, hearings on retirement or disability
to be determined by such council, board, or committee as shall be provided
by rule or law. It also enables the chief justice to call to active service any
retired judge capable of serving.
Section 33. Permits the increase of salaries of judges of courts of record
during their terms of office.
In February, as had been stated, copies of all of these bills and resolutions were made available to the legislators throughout the state. In Denver,
members of the committee have met with all of the Denver legislators and
the written consent of all but three, to the date of this article, have been
obtained to the proposed bills and resolutions and to the calling of a special
session for these matters only. In addition, the consent of four legislators
outside of Denver has been obtained. Since these legislators number approximately one-quarter of the assembly, the committee still feels that it may be
successful in obtaining consent of a majority of legislators to a special session
in 1948 for the consideration of these non-controversial measures.
If they are-adopted, some increase in salaries and a provision for retirement pensions seems reasonably well assured. Furthermore, the judicial council
could then be appointed to carry on the work of this committee, and of other
committees appointed by the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations. There
will also be provision for the integration of our courts under a strong chief
justice. The committee has no intention of abandoning the non-partisan
method of selecting judges under nominating commissions as a part of its
plan. At the 1949 regular session of the legislature it will attempt to persuade
the legislature to pass a resolution for a constitutional amendment for this
purpose, so that the people may vote upon it in 1950.
The committee earnestly urges all members of the bar to discuss these
measures with the legislators in their respective counties and to give all
possible assistance in forwarding these important improvements to our judicial system.

Board of Governors Meets
The Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association met in Denver
on March 20 and considered a number of important matters. A complete
report of the activities of the association during the current year will be published in an early issue of DICTA.

DICTA

Life Insurance-A Frozen Asset
By CHARLES C. NICOLA

of the Denver Bar
Only a few can afford to die. In the past decade death has been transformed from its historic role as the advent of the better life into a taxable
event of overwhelming magnitude and dismal consequences. Acceptance of
the proposition that one must pay as he goes--and pay handsomely-has
precipitated a shift in emphasis among problems of estate planning. The
protection of the estate from the impact of federal taxation has emerged as
a factor of principal concern to prospective decedents and their advisers.
The problem customarily involves two considerations-the minimization
of taxes and the provision of funds for their payment. The irrevocable
living trust is the most favored device for accomplishing this dual objective.
By depleting the gross taxable estate through inter vivos gifts, this plan
travels the only broad avenue which remains open for minimization of
estate tax; and if the trust is properly constructed, the availability of the
corpus thereof for payment of the settlor's death taxes may be retained
without subjecting such funds to inclusion in the settlor's gross estate. The
trust offers the additional feature of excluding the corpus thereof from the
income beneficiary's taxable estate, thus eliminating a "second" estate tax
on the same property.
But great care must be given to the terms of the trust and to the type
of property to be placed in trust if maximum tax benefits are to be derived.
If the corpus of the trust is to be excluded from the settlor's gross estate,
close attention must be paid to the following fundamentals:
1. The trust must be irrevocable. If the settlor reserves the right to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust, its corpus will be swept
into his gross estate by operation of Section 811(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
2. The transfer in trust must not be made in contemplation of death,
or the corpus thereof will be includible in the settlor's gross estate
under Section 811 (c).
3. The transfer in trust must not be intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the settlor's death, or the corpus thereof
will be includible under another provision of Section 811 (c). Under
the rule of the Hallock case 1 the transfer in trust will be regarded
as one intended to take effect at the settlor's death if he reserves a
possibility of reverter in the corpus.
4. The settlor must not reserve certain rights over and benefits from
trust property, as particularly set out in Section 811(c). Broadly
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106.
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speaking, this includes a reservation for the settlor's life of the right
to receive the income from the trust or the right to designate the
persons who are to receive the income.
The foregoing are the prerequisites of a valid irrevocable gift in trust.
Each must be satisfied if the corpus of the trust is to be removed sufficiently
from the dominion and control of the settlor so that it will not be regarded
as his at his death and thus includible in his taxable estate. To intend that
the transfer possess these qualities is, of course, not enough. The successful
creation of such a trust depends upon the draftsman's familiarity with the
law of federal taxation and with the frequently changing meanings ascribed
to these terms which are subject to constant redefinition by regulations and
court and board decisions.
It has been asserted that notwithstanding the fact that the settlor has
parted absolutely and forever with the property comprising the trust, he
may set up the trust in such a manner that the assets thereof may be used by
the executor of his estate to pay death taxes. It has also been represented
that this can be accomplished without subjecting the assets of the trust to
inclusion in the settlor's taxable estate. This result is achieved customarily
by including among the broad powers of management and investment given
to the trustee, the power to lend funds to or purchase property from the
executor of the estate of the settlor upon such terms as the trustee, in his
sole discretion, shall deem appropriate. The trustee is thus in a position to
rescue from the estate of the settlor at a fair price, assets of the estate which
otherwise might have to be sold in the open market at substantial loss for
the purpose of raising funds in a short time for the payment of death taxes.
Without this provision, the settlor is obliged to retain in his personal estate
relatively unproductive liquid assets of sufficient value to pay the taxes which
accrue at his death. With this provision he may dispose of them safely during his lifetime, seizing the tax advantages which attend the depletion of his
estate, but retaining the use of those funds for. the same purpose to which
they would have been put had he kept them in his taxable estate.
This is the broad general outline of the terms of a trust designed to
accomplish minimization of estate taxes consistent with the maintenance of
funds for their payment. It should be noted parenthetically, but without
discussion of the many ramifications of the problem, that substantial reductions in surtaxable net income are available to the settlor through use of such
a living trust, if the settlor limits his reservation of administrative control
and power of disposition to the bounds prescribed by Sections 29.22(a)21 and 22, Regulations 111, and the income beneficiary is not one whom the
settlor is legally obligated to support.2 Such a beneficiary cannot be a financially emancipated child of the settlor. The income of the trust thus may be
Section 167 I. R. C. includes in the taxable income of the settlor of a trust that
part of the income of the trust which is applied or distributed for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the settlor is legally obligated to support or maintain.
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the broad and almost all
kept within the same family group notwithstanding
3
inclusive prohibition of the Clifford doctrine.
If the transfer in trust constitutes a valid gift, it will save estate taxes
and income taxes, but may subject the settlor to a gift tax. However, that is
not a substantial objection to the plan. Against his potential gift tax liability,
the settlor may claim a specific exemption of $30,000.00, which exemption
is forever lost to him if he does not take it. 4 The value of the gift in excess
of $30,000.00 is taxed at a rate which is approximately 25 % less than the
estate tax rate. The difference in tax is actually much greater than the percentage differential suggests, because the gift removes the corpus thereof from
taxation in the highest estate tax bracket and subjects it to a tax in the lowest
gift tax bracket.
So much for the terms of the trust and the tax-wise results which can
be anticipated therefrom. If maximum benefits to the settlor are to be obtained,
particular attention must be paid to the type of property to be placed in
trust. If the property is such that can be expected to increase in value subsequent to the taxable transfer, the gift tax will be at a lower rate, in a lower
bracket, and on a lower valuation. It should be property which will continue
to produce after it has been transferred, unlike assets of the settlor's the
earning capacity of which may depend upon the exercise of his individual
skill and management, such as the settlor's business. Inasmuch as the income
from the trust is not to be reserved it should be property upon which the
settlor is not dependent for his support. It should be property which is
reasonably liquid, for it must be capable of being reduced to cash in the open
market with a minimum of loss, if it is to be used for the payment of taxes
as discussed above.
Life insurance is an asset possessing all of these qualities to a marked
degree and it has been sold to many people largely on the strength of its
adaptability to the payment of death taxes. Insured persons have seized upon
the opportunity to exclude life insurance proceeds from their taxable estates
through creation of funded life insurance trusts. The transfer of policies by
the insured to a trustee coupled with release of all incidents of ownership "
pertaining to the policies and the payment of premiums by someone other
than the insured subsequent to the transfer, became a well accepted plan
of estate tax avoidance. The funded life insurance trust is a sound proposition, not only from the points of view of the settlor and his benefiiciaries,
but from the standpoint of the public revenue. Wherever used, it provides
3

Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331.
'The $3,000.00 annual exclusion of gifts to each donee is not applicable to gifts
in trust except to the extent of the interest of the income beneficiary. As to remaindermen, the gift is regarded to be one of a future interest to which the annual exclusion
does not apply.
' Incidents of ownership include the right to change the beneficiary, to borrow
against the policy, to pledge it as security, to assign, surrender or convert it.
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a reserve of cash which is available immediately at death for the payment
of taxes. It would seem to have been the purpose of proper legislation to
have encouraged the use of life insurance in gifts, and it is surprising, therefore, that plans involving the transfer inter vivos of life insurance policies
were dealt a fatal blow by the 1942 amendment to Section 811(g) of the
Internal Revenue Code 6-the section dealing with the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the taxable estate of the insured.
This amendment is widely known for its removal of $40,000.00 specific
exemption which had been made available by revenue acts in effect from
1918 to 1942, to proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the insured's
executor. But practically no discussion has been accorded the provisions of
the amendment which "freezes" life insurance proceeds in the taxable estate
of the insured. In effect, life insurance proceeds are no longer excludable in
their entirety from the insured's gross estate unless he released all incidents
of ownership prior to January 10, 1941, and has paid no premiums since.
If the incidents of ownership were released before that date but the insured
has paid premiums since, the proceeds are includible in his taxable estate
in .n amount which bears the same proportion to the total proceeds realized
tnat the amount of premiums paid by the insured since January 10, 1941,
bears to the total premiums paid. If the incidents of ownership are released
at a date subsequent to January 10, 1941, the proceeds are includible in the
insured's taxable estate in an amount which bears the same proportion to
the total proceeds realized that the amount of premiums paid by the insured
bears to the total premiums paid. If the incidents of ownership are not re-.
leased prior to the death of the insured, all of the proceeds realized are includible in his taxable estate regardless of who paid the premiums and in
what amount.
If properly advised, persons making application for new or additional
life insurance can avoid the full fury of this legislation under some circumstances by arranging for the payment of premiums by someone else and by
failing to reserve to themselves any of the various incidents of ownership.
While insurance may be written on the lives of those who are uninsurable
physically where its purchase is coupled with the purchase of an annuity
'Section 811. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible
or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the U. S.

(g) "'Receivableby the Executor. To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor or as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent.
"Receivable by other beneficiaries. To the extent of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent
(A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly
by the decedent, in proportion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to
the total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable
either alone or in conjunction with any other person. - * *"
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those who are insurable are most frequently of an age at which it is unwise
to release incidents of ownership. Too much of life remains ahead for such
an insured to make it prudent for him to forego the right to change the beneficiary, to borrow against the policy, to pledge it as security, or to assign,
surrender or convert it. And arranging for another to pay premiums must
not be an easy thing for most insured persons to accomplish. It is no answer
to suggest that the insured might transfer funds to his wife or to some other
persons to be used by them for the payment of premiums, for the tax advanages are lost if the insured pays the premiums directly or indirectly. A House
committee report interpreting this expression considersothe case suggested and
states that under that situation it is the legislative intent that the payments
of premiums be considered to have been made by the insured, even though
they are not directly traceable to the precise funds transferred by the insured.
It is this prohibition against payment by the insured directly or indirectly
that has knocked out the insurance trust funded with assets provided by the
insured. It seems quite apparent that in the ordinary case it is not feasible
for most new or additional insurance to be set up in a form which will exclude
the proceeds from the insured's taxable estate.
What about insurance which has been in force for a number of years?
What rearrangements of these policies may be made looking toward the exclusion of the proceeds from the insured's taxable estate? Here the situation
is really very desperate. Hardly anyone has any business thinking about
surrendering the incidents of ownership over his life insurance until he can
predict with reasonable accuracy his own financial situation and that of his
named beneficiaries over the span of years which separates him from death.
Such a person is usually well advanced beyond middle age, and, in the ordinary case, he has always paid the premiums on his life insurance. Much of
his insurance may be "paid up." The amended provisions of the estate tax
law relating to life insurance offer no way in which he can exclude from
his taxable estate more than a negligible proportion of the proceeds of his
life insurance. He could release all incidents of ownership at his advanced
age with some degree of security. And if he could find someone who would
pay the few premiums which remain to be paid on those policies which have
not already become "paid up," some of the proceeds could be excluded from
his taxable estate. But the only amount of the proceeds which would not
be includible would be the amount which bears the same proportion to the
total proceeds realized as the amount of premiums paid by one other than
the insured bears to the total premiums paid-an insignificant amount at
best. If the insured's wife is a person of independent means, it might be wise
for him to convert his policies into policies of "paid up" insurance. The
proceeds payable on his death would be substantially reduced thereby and
the loss could be compensated by additional insurance on his life taken dut
by his wife and paid for from her own funds. But this would be the excep-
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tional case and does not present a serious qualification to the general statement that life insurance has been frozen in the insured's taxable estate. In
the ordinary case the only way that life insurance can be made the subject
of an inter vivos gift is by accepting its cash surrender value and making a
gift of the proceeds. Notwithstanding significant estate tax savings, surrender
normally involves a net loss so substantial that the plan is not entitled to
serious consideration.
The fact is that Congress has placed a restraint upon the disposition of
life insurance which is not applicable to property generally. In so doing it
has precluded the use of life insurance for purposes which appear to deserve
the support of intelligent legislation. The doctrine must be of most serious
concern to those whose principal or sole asset is life insurance, for they are
very likely to be in a position where they cannot seize the tax advantages to
be obtained from making gifts because they have no other property which
can be disposed of by gift. But to all who seek to cushion the impact of
federal taxation and to whom the disposition of large amounts of property
by gift appears to be the most practicable escape from confiscatory estate
taxes, the "freezing" of life insurance in the insured's estate must present
a fatal objection to its purchase in substantial amounts.

Ancient and Modern Leases
By EDWIN J. WITTELSHOFER
On the Denver bar, chairman of the Committees on Real Estate
Standards of the Denver and the Colorado Bar Associations, to
whom we are indebted for much of the progress which has been
made in the adoption of real estate title standards, and the
resulting uniformity in real estate practice in both Denver and
the entire state. An address before the Denver Bar Association,
March 1, 1948.

The method of leasing lands and tenements under written memoranda
is one of the earliest legal practices of history. Its precise origin is shrouded
in antiquity and it seems to have had early birth in all recognized legal
systems.
The form and method of leasing in this country is easily traced to England
where such practice was well implanted even before William, the Conqueror.
While in these early days leases were not regarded with too much sanctity
and were easily voided by the landlord, during the reign of Henry the VIII
acts were passed which permitted tenants to. maintain their rights to possession of leased property even against the landlord. These acts seem to be not
only the last but almost the only benefit established by statute law for aid
to the tenant.
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The limitation in long term leases of 99 years is easily traced to English influence. Mathew Bacon, an English legal writer in a book published
in 1798, recites that 99 years is the longest term possible because it represents
three lives. Why this should be so, he does not state. Other authors contend
that the Common Law of England prevents leasing beyond 100 years.
Possibly lawyers in their endeavor to keep well within the law adopted 99
years as the ultimate. This Common Law rule, however, does not seem to
be evidenced by any legal decisions.
Among the earliest written leases is one translated for us by Mr. John
Wigmore in his work on the Greek Legal System. It is dated 350 B.C. and
is in form, text and content astonishingly like the leases of the present day.
It contains no direct obligation to be performed by the landlord, but has
seventeen specific obligations to be undertaken by the tenant.
Following this translation Mr. Wigmore continues with this statement:
"Who can doubt that this instrument represents a long accumulation of experience in technical draftsmanship and legal maneuvers?" Comparing this
lease with that of the present day we must concede that there has been some
considerable accumulation of experience and legal maneuvering since that
date, but principally in the direction of creating a lease "of the landlord, by
the landlord and for the landlord." For the general and customary lease of
today while it still contains no obligations for performance by the landlord,
has added enumerable additional obligations for compliance by the tenant.
In Denver, there are two general forms of leases in use for business
property. The older form, known as No. 864, sets forth in bold type the
term and rental provisions; and then, in such small type that I defy any one
over forty years of age to read it without a magnifying glass, a multitude of
obligations to be assumed by the tenant. There is no obligation undertaken
by the landlord except, if so filled in, to furnish heat and light. Some years
ago, in going through some of the archives of the old firm of Benedict &
Phelps, I ran across the original draft of this lease prepared by the late A. C.
Phelps for the real estate exchange. It bore the date as I now recollect of 1887.
The other form is of much more recent vintage, at least as to format,
and bears the imprint of approval of the Real Estate Exchange and Building
Owners Association. It contains eighteen sections and twelve rules and
regulations quite entirely devoted to imposing duties upot the tenant, but
does contain one paragraph (the last one) in which the landlord warrants
the tenant peaceful possession of the demised premises.
Under present day conditions of supp!y and demand with reference to
locations, the great tendency is constantly to increase the burdens of the
tenant.
Sometime ago a lease of Denver property, prepared however in New
York, was presented to the speaker for inspection and consideration. It
contained two covenants which illustrate this tendency. The first condition
sets forth that in the event the tenant should institute a court action under
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the lease and not succeed in obtaining judgment, the landlord might recover,
as costs, all his expenses in defending the suit, including attorney fees. The
other covenant was similar to the cognovit condition appearing in some
promissory notes; that is, permitting any attorney of record to appear for
the tenant in any court and confess judgment, etc. Now it sometimes occurs
that the tenant, falling out with his landlord, will bring a purely vexatious
action; and also occasionally the tenant makes it difficult in F.E.D. actions
for the landlord to get service upon him. But vexatious suits and difficulties
in obtaining service are at least equally annoying to the tenant as they are
to the landlord, and fairness and equity require such provisions to be reciprocal.
If unilateral provisions such as these shall continue to be added to leases,
I venture the suggestion that the courts in seeking to do justice will interpret
the text of these conditions in the light of what fair men should agree upon
without too much concern as to the precise language used, in the same manner
as was resorted to in the interpretation of insurance policies before such
provisions were made futile under legislative requirements.
Because there may be present here today members of the bench, perhaps
I had better add the observation that the last previous statement is pure
dictum-should I ever be engaged in defense of the landlord concerning such
unilateral conditions.
Without attempting to enter into a detailed discussion of the obligations
of tenant in the forms of leases currently in use in this community, I am
constrained, for the purpose of illustratibn, to direct attention to a few, viz:
(a) The limitation upon the obligation of the landlord in those leases
in which he is required to furnish heat-to do so only beginning October 1
and ending April 30. It not infrequently occurs that we have late springs
and early falls and days when, without heat furnished by the landlord, the
tenant is greatly disturbed in the operation of his business and has no convenient way to relieve against such conditions.
(b) The provision that the tenant must act as an insurer of the landlord
for any damage or injury arising through breakage or leakage of water or
gas pipes, etc., even though such breakage is the result of ordinary wear and
tear, while at the same time he, the tenant, waives all claims against the
landlord for any injury accruing froin the acts of owners or occupants of
adjoining property, even when such occupants hold under the same landlord.
(c) The requirement that the tenant return the property in as good
order and condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted. This
in itself is probably a fair and proper provision but attached to it is the
obligation not to call upon the landlord for any outlay for maintenancethis without limit as to maintenance of roofs, walls, exterior surfaces, etc.
(d) The condition attempting to create a chattel mortgage or lien upon
the personal property of the tenant as security for rent-a provision of more
than doubtful enforceability but at least a threat to the free exercise of the
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tenant in relation to his property. No question is here raised as to the fairness on the part of the landlord to require security, but only to the method.
(e) The provision in regard to requiring written consent by the landlord to an assignment of the lease. This provision might well be qualified
with the condition that such consent be not unreasonably withheld.
Fairness prompts me to say that most provisions in the lease have definite equitable purposes and doubtlessly have been based upon the landlord's
experiences. And it must be said that by and large, landlords, notwithstanding the specific terms of the lease, have attempted to deal fairly with the
tenant. But the tenant as a matter of right should have his protection and
not be dependent upon the equitable action of the landlord.
Notwithstanding that the current form of lease as used in Denver attempts to afford the fullest protection to the landlord, there are some suggestions and comments for his betterment which I would like to offer.
1. It is becoming more and more commonplace for landlords to require
security for the performance by the tenant of the terms of the lease. The
provision for this guaranty as frequently inserted, namely: the payment of
the month or months' rent-all too often leads to difficulties in case of forfeiture or surrender. The best method is to add the amount of the guaranty to the amount of the monthly rental and include the total as the amount
of the first month's rent, the last monthly rental being stated as the nominal
rental of one dollar. No question can then arise as to the intent or extent of
the guaranty in case of default.
2. In cases where the tenant undertakes to pay taxes, heat, light, water,
and the like, the provision in connection therewith should require these payments to be collected by the landlord as rent so that the payment may be
enforced in a summary manner.
3. Another provision which present conditions make important is that
which relieves the landlord from liability in case he is unable to deliver
possession on the date stated in the lease without fault on his part, such as
the refusal of a prior tenant to surrender at the expiration of his term.
4. In these days of financial uncertainties many landlords are seeking
protection against greatly increased property and other taxes and possible
inflation. Proper provisions against these conditions require technical skill
in legal draftsmanship. To some extent the percentage lease is a safeguard
against inflation.
In view of what has previously been said, I believe it has become important that the realtor who negotiates the lease and the lawyer who sometimes, but not too often, is called upon to render an opinion in reference
thereto, should review these forms now in use, and, if felt proper, reform
them in the light of modern business uncertainties and the modern concept
of fairness and justice. If we do not regard this as our duty, we cannot take
pride in our respective profession and business and shall have failed in our
basic obligations.
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True it may be that the landlord-owner of the premises may have a legal
and equitable right to require such conditions as he may desire, however
burdensome, for the tenant has a corresponding right to accept or reject
them. But when the Real Estate Exchange prepares, adopts and offers to
the public as fair and proper an established form of lease and the lawyer
commonly accepts and uses such form, a duty is imposed upon both realtor
and lawyer that the form so used meets the standard of fairness and equity.
Beside attention to the printed forms of lease, we should also give better
attention to the execution of them as well as to seeing that they are properly
filled out. All too often leases are executed by someone other than the legal
owner as by way of illustration, the husband for the wife and even the agent
for the owner, perhaps with verbal authority but seldom with the written
authority necessary for proof if required.
Again, those portions of the printed form of leases not pertinent to the
particular one being prepared should be deleted and additional provisions,
if required, not in the printed form should be prepared with proper draftsmanship and not made doubtful of meaning for lack of wordage in order
to be inserted in the small spaces allowed in the printed form. The description especially should be fully, accurately and completely set forth. Rcently
a landlord lost the right of considerable income from the basement of a business block because of the indefinite description of portions of that basement
allotted to the several tenants under their respective leases.
It frequently happens that under leases of considerable term and at
present rental value, the aggregate rental is greatly in excess of the present
actual value of the property itself, and in many cases tenants invest large
sums in remodelling the property leased. In such cases, some tenants and
especially chain store tenants are requiring an examination and opinion of
the title of the real estate, not only to be assured of record ownership but
to make certain that their lease is not junior to an encumbrance, the foreclosure of which might cut it out. Certainly such requirement is in many
cases prudent and desirable.
All too often the landlord does not even know the contents of the lease
he has signed, nor has he much idea of his responsibility beyond the term
which for his property is let and the rental to be received until, like the
landlord as related in Colo. Mortgage Co. v. Giacomini (55 Colo. 540), he
is confronted with a judgment of $10,000.00 notwithstanding that the injury
upon which the judgment was based resulted in a large part to the negligence
of the tenant; while the tenant, seemingly even less informed, has not the
least idea of the difficulties which may be in store for him until, as related in
Thum Bros. v. Rhodes (12 Colo. App. 245), a part of the wall of the premises falls down and he finds that under the usual and customary lease in use
there is no obligation upon the part of his landlord to repair or replace the
same.
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In relation to these difficulties, the question arises what is the duty of
the agent and what is the duty of the lawyer.
The decisions of our courts have established that a landlord and tenant
deal at arm's length; that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in leasing
transactions and that there are no implied warranties, at least as to the important matter of fitness and condition of the demised premises. The agent
is a financially interested party to the transaction, his services being rewarded
only in case the lease is finally executed; he is, in a sense, an agent for both
parties and has a duty to both. Under such circumstances has he a right to
prepare the lease with all its pitfalls or to advise either or both the landlord
and tenant as to the sufficiency of the lease or the obligations under it. I
think he has no more right to do these things than has the lawyer to attempt
to negotiate the terms of the lease in the first instance. The. agent is not a
good lawyer just as the lawyer is not a good agent. The parties to such an
intricate instrument as a lease can be sufficiently and best served only when
they have the advice of both agent and lawyer.
A type of leasing coming more and more into use not only in larger
communities, but also in smaller, is known as the percentage lease. The main
idea underlying this lease is by no means new or novel-it was used in the
earliest days and is the usual form in relation to farm leases.
While there are several commonly accepted types of this sort of lease,
the two mostly in vogue are the lease with a definitely indicated rental to
which is added a stated percentage of gross sales over and above a given
amount, and the lease calling for a stated percentage of gross sales as rental
with a guaranteed minimum.
In these days of inflated rental values and uncertain business conditions
the percentage lease would appear to have many advantages. It gives a
scientific basis for the establishment of rental value and often offers a compromise between the tenant's and landlord's differences regarding those values.
Again, it tends to establish better relationship between both tenant and landlord. A tenant will cheerfully pay large rental when his volume of business
warrants such payment but often feels aggrieved when the result of most
of his time, effort and endeavor are absorbed in rents. It also affords a sort
of hedge against inflation.
There are some factors, however, which have militated against extensive
use of such leases. Principally these are:
1. The lack of real estate agents in informing themselves of and studying this type of lease. To negotiate a percentage lease calls for knowledge and
ability of the agent which he can only acquire by diligent study and preparation.
2. The difficultiy of ascertaining a basis for the establishment of the
commission earned by the agent. In view of the benefits to both landlord
and tenant, the agent is entitled to a commensurate compensation.
3. The position of the landlord, in many cases, of demanding full rental
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value, in addition to the percentage, which attitude negatives the purpose
of such leases.
4. The difficulty of the small merchant in estimating properly the
amount of percentage he can reasonably pay.

It is quite likely that not only in Denver, but throughout the metro,
politan area, percentage leases will come more and more into use, particularly
with the expansion, of chain stores. Both the real estate agent and lawyer
will do well in giving study and attention to this type of leasing. It must
be understood, however, that such leasing can apply successfully only with
a limited class of tenants.
What has here been presented is not to be taken as a critical review of
the present leasing methods, but rather as a means of implementing in our
minds the vast changes in commercial life and the steady progress toward
a business relationship built upon fairness and equity-a relationship not
based on the doctrine of caveat emptor but seeking only mutual and common
benefits.

Has The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Been
Abandoned in Colorado?
By

GEORGE

T.

EVANS

of the Denver Bar

In the' British-American system of jurisprudence, precedent is important.
History discloses that since the days of the Year Books (1290-1535) lawyers
and judges have been assiduously engaged not only in making the law consistent within itself but even in developing the "mechanical" means requisite
to insure and facilitate that consistency. Lord Coke, who died in 1634, said
that "Out of the old fields must spring the new corn," I and it is a known
fact that much of his writing was devoted to collecting, classifying and reconciling old cases from the Year Books and other sources, so that the bench and
bar of his day could have at hand the ancient authorities in point in their own
cases. By Blackstone's time (1728-1780) this adherence to precedent seems
to have developed into the doctrine, modernly called stare decisis, for he is
reported 2 to have said:
"For it is an established rule to abide former precedents where the
same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice
even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion;
as also the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what
was before uncertain and perhaps indifferent is now become a permanent
rule which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary
from according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine not
according to his own private judgment but according to the known laws
1. Co. Rep. (Pref.)
2. Cooleys Blackstone, 4 Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 70-71.
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and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce new law but to
expound the old * * *
"The doctrine of the law is this: That precedents and rules must
be followed unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though their reason be
not obvious at first view, we owe such deference to former times as not
to suppose that they acted wholly without consideration, * * *"
In more recent times a judge of the highest court in Connecticut showed
the necessity for respecting precedent in deciding current cases in the following words:
"If the law, well established, may be annulled by an opinion, a foundation is laid for the most reckless instability * * * No system of inflexible adherence to established law can be as pernicious as such ceaseless
and interminable fluctuations." 3
These earlier views of the beneficent doctrine we now call stare decisis
have persisted in high places. Mr. Justice White (later Mr. Chief Justice
White) of the Supreme Court of the United States, said in a dissenting
opinion:
"The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one hedged
about by precedents which are binding on the court, without regard to
the personality of its members. Break down this belief in judicial continuity and let it be felt that on great constitutional questions this court
is to depart from the settled conclusions of its predecessors and to determine them according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill
its bench and our constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value
and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of
the people." 4
In 1913 the Supreme Court of Colorado had before it the question of
whether or not article XX of the Constitution of Colorado (the home rule
amendment) conferred upon the City of Denver exclusive power to regulate
the sale of intoxicating liquors within its boundaries as against a state law then
5
inforce.
In holding that article XX of the Constitution (the home rule amendment) did not give Denver any such power, the court said in part:
"The regulation of the liquor traffic is certainly a matter of concern
and great importance to the people of the entire state, and there is
nothing in the language of article XX to justify the assumption that they
intended to relinquish the right to legislate concerning it in any portion
of the state. This position is further strengthened by the fact that heretofore exclusive local regulation had been given to Denver and other
cities, but thereafter these acts had been amended so that when article
3.

Hosmer, C. J., in Palmers Admr. v. Mead (1828)

7 Conn. 149,

157, 158.

4. Pollock vs. Farmers L & T Co. (1895) 1.57 U. S., 427, 651, 652.
5. Walker vs. People (1913) 55 Colo. 402.
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XX was adopted Denver's regulation of the liquor traffic was then subject to the existing laws of the state. Under such circumstances and in
the absence of some language in article XX to indicate the contrary, we
cannot believe that it was intended to divest the state of its entire
jurisdiction in this territory upon this important subject." 6
Thus Denver's assertion as a home rule city in 1913 that it had exclusive
control of the regulation of the liquor traffic within its borders was overruled
by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Again in 1936 this conflict between a home rule city and the state came
before the Supreme Court. There the question was whether the legislature
by statute could direct the disposition of certain beer license fees collected by
Colorado Springs (a home rule city under article XX). The court held that
the power of the legislature was paramount over the regulation of the liquor
traffic in all its phases and that this was especially true since the people bf
Colorado in 1932 adopted article XXII of the constitution. Mr. Justice
Burke, for the court, said in part:
"These questions are disposed of by amended article XXII of the
constitution * * *. By its provisions the regulation of the manufacture
and sale of 'all intoxicating liquors' became 'exclusively' the subject of
,statutory laws' from July 1, 1933. If this chapter conflicts in any way
with said section 6 of article XX or said section 11 of article II, those
were, to that extent, amended by it. Thereby the regulation and sale of
intoxicating liquor passed under the exclusive control of the legislature." T
Thus it was decided that, whatever the situation before presently subsisting article XXII became part of the Constitution of Colorado, thereafter
the power of the legislature to regulate liquor throughout the length and
breadth of Colorado was paramount, supreme and all-inclusive, and, indeed,
in view of the wording of article XXII such a view seems unassailable. Article
XXII, so far as material here, is as follows:
"* * * from and after July 1, 1933, the manufacture, sale and dis,
tribution of all intoxicating liquors wholly within the State of Colorado,
shall, subject to the constitution and laws of the United States, be per,
formed exclusively by or through such agencies and under such regulations
as may hereafter be provided by statutory laws of the State of Colorado;
In 1939 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the case of Denver vs. the
People,s involving practically the same question as that in the Colorado
Springs case, supra, and arrived at the same conclusion as in the Colorado
Springs case. In the course of its opinion the court said:
"No one would seriously contend that the granting of licenses for
6. Ibid., 406.
7. City of Colo. Springs vs. People (1936) 99 Colo. 525, 527.
8. Denver vs. People, 103 Colo. 565.
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the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not an incident of the
liquor traffic and controllable as such." 9
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Bakke.
On December 31, 1946, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
a case which involved a conflict between the right of Denver as a home rule
city and the power of the legislature under article XXII of the constitution
to designate the liquor licensing authority for Denver. 10 By section 9 of the
Liquor Code of 1935, the legislature designated the city council as Denver's
licensing instrumentality. It said:
"Section 9.* * * Where the license fee is to be paid into the treasury of any * * * city and county the licenses in this act provided for
shall be issued by the council in a city and county * * *"
There was no dispute as to the intention of the legislature, as expressed
in section 9 of the Liquor Code, above noted. The argument for Denver
was that the legislature was powerless, in view of the home rule provisions of
article XX, to designate any particular instrumentality of the City and County
of Denver as its liquor licensing authority. And the Supreme Court sustained
that view in a four to three decision," the opinion being written by Mr. Justice Hilliard. In part the court said:
"* * * we conclude the general assembly properly has required the
City and County of Denver to discharge the duty of receiving, considering, and acting upon applications submitted by those seeking licenses to
dispense liquors within its territory, as contemplated in the Liquor Code
of 1935; but, the * * * agency through which that public entity shall
perform and discharge such assigned duty is within the City and County's
keeping, that is to say, through appropriate charter enactment. It follows
that since Denver, proceeding so, as we have seen, has created an office
or agency called manager of safety and excise, to the occupant of which
it has assigned all licensing authority, only that official, and not the city
council, has authority to act upon applications of the nature of the one
here under consideration, and issue, or refuse to grant, licenses for the
sale of intoxicating liquors in the City and County of Denver.
"Moreover, we are disposed to the view that perforce another
provision of the constitution, although not cited or argued, the statutory
section involved, in so far as it applies to the City and County of Denver,
* * * is void."
The court then goes on to mention the fact that since Denver is the only
city and county in the state and since the absolute requirement of section 9
that the city council in a city and county be the liquor licensing authority,
9. Ibid., 571.
10. Reed v. Blakley, et al, (Dec. 31, 1946; Rehearing denied Jan. 11, 1947),
115 Colo. 5 9.
11. Ibid., The majority: Justices Bakke, Burke, Hilliard, Luxford. (Dissenting:
Justices Knous, Jackson, Stone)
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such legislation was special as to Denver and therefore contrary to article V,
section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado.
Article V was part of the original constitution adopted in 1876. Article
XXII, authorizing the liquor traffic in Colorado and providing that the general
assembly should regulate it, was adopted in 1932. Article XXII is not mentioned or referred to in the Reed decision. Walker v. People (1913), supra,
holding that article XX gives Denver no right to control liquor within its
borders; City of Colorado Springs v. People (1936), supra, and Denver v.
People, (1939), supra, (the latter two decisions holding that article XXII
gave the general assembly complete, plenary and all-inclusive power over
liquor regulation' in all of Colorado) were neither applied, distinguished, modified, overruled or commented on.
And so far as article V, section 25 is concerned, it has been construed
by the Supreme Court in a number of cases beginning in 1884 12 and continuing down to 1943,' l in all of which it has been held that the question of
whether a general or a special law can be made applicable to a.given situation
is for legislative determination and that courts can interfere only where there
is a clear abuse of discretion by the legislature. No such abuse is found by the
court in the Reed case, but that portion of section 9 of the Liquor Code was,
nevertheless struck down.
Has the doctrine of stare decisis been abandoned in Colorado?

Additional Committee Appointment
A. THAD SMITH, 1011 University Bldg., Denver, has been appointed a member of the Committee on Legal Institutes of the Denver Bar Association by
President Horace F. Phelps.

Personals
A. WALSH has become a member of the firm of Miller and McKinley
with change of name to Miller, McKinley and Walsh. Other members of
the firm are David J. Miller and Richard McKinley. The firm will office in
the Coronado Bldg., Greeley.
WILLIAM L. BRANCH has opened his office in the E. & C. Bldg., Denver. His
practice is restricted to matters of taxation.
FRANKLIN A. THAYER, formerly Veterans Service Officer of Colorado and
National Service Officer for the Disabled American Veterans has opened his
office at 403-404 Symes Bldg., Denver.
LAWRENCE.M. HENRY, member of the House of Representatives of the Colo.rado General Assembly,.and former deputy clerk.of the county court, Denver,
has opened his office for the practice of law at 618 Symes Bldg., Denver.
EDWARD

12. Brown v. Denver (1884) 7 Colo. 305.
13.

McClain v. People (1943)

111 Colo. 271.

DICTA

Letters to the Editor
Editor:
I have just concluded reading the January, 1948 issue of DICTA, including
article on "The Responsibility of Lawyers", all with a great deal of interest.
The latter subject directs my attention again to a matter which should be a
concern to all lawyers, namely the current practice of the Supreme Court
affirming trial court decisions without written opinion. If such affirmances
were limited to frivolous appeals, the practice would be justified as a rebuke
to the lawyer taking the appeal. However, when a civil liberty or property
right of consequence is at stake, and issues are debatable and parties are required to print records and briefs, failure of the Supreme Court to thereafter
write an opinion gives cause for just complaint. Every lawyer should be interested in his cause, and there are few lawyers who advise an appeal to the
Supreme Court who do not have faith in their own position on the issues.
After spending his client's hard-to-get money in printing records and briefs,
on recommendation that an appeal be taken, what can he say to that client
when so little regard appears to have been given to the case in the court of last
resort? Either the lawyer will suffer loss of confidence in his community, or
the client and his friends will have cause to charge that justice is something
too remote, or comes at too high cost, for the ordinary individual.
In last night's issue of the Greeley Tribune the editor had an editorial
based on the December number of the Journal of American Judicature Society,
and study of disposition of civil cases in State Supreme Courts. I assume that
some lawyer other than the writer of this letter furnished our city editor with
a copy of that journal, and that he too is concerned. From the editorial it
appears that the Colorado Supreme Court is further behind in handling of
appealed cases than any other state Supreme Court in. the 48 states. And this
too, notwithstanding the number of cases affirmed without written opinion,
and the few in number appearing in Pacific Reporters.
With the foregoing in mind, what reason has the Colorado Bar Ass'n.
to expect approval of its proposals to raise judicial salaries and change present
methods of nominating candidates for judicial office? If lawyers lose confidence
in courts and judges, what may we expect of those already critical of our
profession as a whole?
I personally think that we lawyers have a greater responsibility to the
public and to our profession, right now, than in urging change in the system
or salary of the judge. We should make known our determination to make
more effective the present judicial agencies, and more responsive to appeals
to right, justice and logic, than seems evident in some of our courts. I also
think it was a serious mistake for the Supreme Court to call upon district
judges for help in writing opinions. It would appear one result naturally
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follows, an inclination to go along with the original findings of the district
judges, but overlooking the fact that most district judges have to render snap
judgment on presented issues, as compared to the opportunity afforded
Supreme Court judges to study and reflect before deciding.
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT E. MANN.

Admitted to a Higher Court
Denver, died March 22 at the age of 75 after
a long illness. He was born in 1873 in Des Moines, Iowa, and was graduated
from the University of Michigan. He came to Denver in 1899, and was soon
thereafter admitted to the Colorado bar. He was a member of Beta Theta Pi,
University Club and Mile-Hi Club. He was well known as a mining corporation attorney.
HARRY WARREN ROBINSON,

well known Greeley attorney, died March 25 at the
age of 63. He was a chairman of the executive committee of the board of
trustees of Colorado State College of Education at the time of his death.
Since 1941 he has practiced in partnership with William R. Kelly. He served
a term as district attorney of the Eighth Judicial District. He was a graduate
of Colorado University School of Law. He was a Rotarian, Mason and Congregationalist.
EARL TYNDALL SNYDER,

M. HERRINGTON, Denver, died March 16 as a result of injuries sustained
in an automobile accident north of Gallup, New Mexico, the preceding Sunday.
He was 51. Born in 1897, he was graduated from Middlesex School, Concord,
Mass., Harvard University in 1914, and Denver University School of Law
in 1917. He was a Mason.
CASS

well known Denver attorney, died of a heart attack
February 28. He was admitted to the bar in Denver in 1896 and served as
assistant district attorney from 1906 to 1914. He was born in Syracuse, N. Y.,
in 1873 and came to Colorado in 1887. He was a graduate of Yale in 1894.
At the time of his death he was practising in partnership with his son, Harry
S. Silverstein, Jr.
HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN,

Lawyers in the Public Service
GILLIAM has been appointed deputy district attorney by Denver
District Attorney James T. Burke.
THOMAS
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Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure
The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted the following amendment to
the Rules of Civil Procedure, effective June 1, 1948:
Rule 115 (7). Abstracts, Briefs, Motions and Withdrawal of Papers.
(h) Printed or Typewritten Abstracts and Briefs.
All abstracts of record and briefs shall bear, on the front cover, the
number and title of the case, the court to which the writ of error lies,
the name of the trial judge, and the names and addresses of attorneys
filing the same. Typewritten briefs shall be legible and upon good paper
eight and one-half inches by thirteen or fourteen inches. Except as otherwise provided all briefs shall be printed and shall be on white wove
antique finish book paper weighing sixty pounds to the ream, twentyfive by thirty-eight inches. They shall be printed on pages nine and
one-quarter inches by six and one-eighth inches when trimmed, in plain
face eleven or twelve point type two point leaded, with face of type
page twenty-four by forty-five ems pica, including the running head.
Extracts and quotations must be in the same type indented two ems.
Briefs and abstracts not in conformity herewith shall not be accepted by
the Clerk for filing except upon order of the court.

Law Violators and the Army
Current court trends in certain sections of the country to dismiss charges
against law violators who agree to enlist in a branch of service is frowned
upon by the armed forces.
Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, in a statement issued from
Fifth Army Headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, clarified the position of the
Department of the Army in the matter of enlistment of felons. He emphasized
that it is the policy of the services not to accept men who have been serious or
frequent offenders.
"It is regrettable," he said, "that in some instances jurists have attempted
to transfer the responsibility for men with criminal records to the armed forces
by dismissing charges upon promise to enlist." He added: "There have been
instances where persons on a quasi-parole basis have been encouraged to enlist in a branch of the services rather than complete prosecution."
The Fifth Army Commander stressed that the services are not to be misrepresented or misconstrued as an alternative to penal incarceration, or processes of law. He said: "It is not the mission of the services to take over the
job of rehabilitation of felons in lieu of imprisonment or probation by local
civil authorities. Service in the Army is a privilege reserved for qualified individuals, ready and able to train for and maintain the military establishment
in the interest of our national security."
Civil offenders, he explained, are not eligible for enlistment until such
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a time as civil authorities have completely relinquished control, and then only
following a probative period as law-abiding members of a community.
Army regulations, he said, bar enlistment of certain questionable categories. These include persons with a record of criminal tendencies, questionable
moral character, a long history of anti-social behavior, or traits of character
which render them unfit to associate with other men. An exception to the
rule must be able to stand up before complete investigation by local enforcement agencies. In such instances, the commanding general of the army takes
responsibility for the final decision, he said.
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